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Abstract
A stochastic evolutionary dynamics of two strategies given by 2 × 2 matrix games
is studied in finite populations. We focus on stochastic properties of fixation: how
a strategy represented by a single individual wins over the entire population. The
process is discussed in the framework of a random walk with arbitrary hopping rates.
The time of fixation is found to be identical for both strategies in any particular
game. The asymptotic behavior of the fixation time and fixation probabilities in the
large population size limit is also discussed. We show that fixation is fast when there
is at least one pure evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the infinite population size
limit, while fixation is slow when the ESS is the coexistence of the two strategies.
1 Introduction
Although the notion of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) was worked out for
finite populations many years ago (Maynard Smith, 1988; Schaffer, 1988; Neil,
2004), and there are numerous studies where finiteness and spatial structure of
populations are taken into account (Nowak & Sigmund, 2004)(and references
therein), models of evolutionary game dynamics are generally considered in
populations of infinite size (Hofbauer & Sigmund, 2003). To study evolution-
ary game dynamics in finite populations Nowak and coworkers (Nowak et al.,
2004; Taylor, C. et al., 2004) generalized Moran’s classical population genetic
model (Moran, 1962) by using frequency dependent fitness. While for infinite
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populations a strategy is defined to be an ESS if its fitness is greater than
the fitness of any rare mutant (Maxnard Smith, 1974), these recent works
emphasize that an ESS strategy have to satisfy two requirements in finite
populations: a) it is resistant against the invasion of rare mutants and b) the
probability that a rare mutant strategy overtakes the resident one is smaller
than it is for random drift (Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor, C. et al., 2004). In
order to investigate these conditions quantitatively, Nowak determined the
invasion coefficients (a)) and the fixation probabilities (b)) in the simplest
2× 2 matrix games in the above cited works. They conclude that apart from
the payoff matrix, the population size plays an equally important role in the
evolutionary dynamics of finite populations. Also, by proving a set of basic
theorems, these authors establish a simple classification of evolutionary sce-
narios in these games. Alternative definitions of ESS in finite populations are
discussed in (Schaffer, 1988; Wild & Taylor, P. D., 2004).
On the other hand, obviously, the characteristic timescales also play a crucial
role in these systems. In some situations, although fixation is probable, it might
occur very slowly or rapidly (Lieberman et al., 2005). For systems with very
slow fixation, the population typically consists of coexisting strategies, as it
takes a long time for a strategy to win over the entire population. Conversely,
systems with short fixation times are often found to be fixated to the preferred
strategy. Moreover, it is possible in principle that the two strategies, when
represented by a single mutant individual, fixate with the same probability
but at different speeds. In this situation the probabilities of fixation would be
insufficient to describe the system. We show in this paper, however, that this
latter situation never occurs. In order to show this, we focus on the average
fixation times of single mutants in the generalized Moran process introduced in
(Taylor, C. et al., 2004). This model is essentially a special case of a random
walk with arbitrary hopping rates and two absorbing states. Some of our
results are obtained for this general random walk.
The paper is organized as follows. After recalling the definition and some basic
properties of the model in Sec. 2, the exact expressions for the average time
to overtake the entire population are derived for both strategies in Sec. 3. We
show that a single mutant following strategy A fixates in the same average time
as a single B player does in a given game, although the probability of fixation
for the two strategies are generally different. An alternative direct proof of this
property is presented in the Appendix. In Sec. 3.1 the neutral game of identical
strategies is considered as the simplest example. In Section 4 the asymptotic
behavior of the fixation time and the fixation probabilities are derived in the
large population size limit. In Sec. 5 we formulate three conjectures making
connections between the speed of fixation and other characteristics of the game
dynamics, based on numerical investigations of the derived formulas. Finally,
the results are summarized and discussed in Sec. 6.
2
2 Model and fixation probabilities
In the evolutionary game introduced in (Taylor, C. et al., 2004), the individ-
uals can follow either A or B strategies defined by the payoff matrix
A B
A a b
B c d
(1)
This matrix lists the average rewards of players after playing numerous times
with each other. Namely anA player receives an average reward a when playing
against another A player, and reward b when playing against a B player.
Similarly, a B player gets reward c when playing against an A player and
reward d when playing against another B player.
Out of the total N individuals, i of them follow strategy A, and N − i follow
strategy B. As each individual plays with every other one, the average fitness
of an individual playing strategy A or B are proportional respectively to
fi = a(i− 1) + b(N − i)
gi = ci+ d(N − i− 1) . (2)
More precisely these fitness values should be normalized by N−1, but that can
be safely ignored as only their ratio appears under the present dynamics. Then
the evolution of the strategies are governed by the following Moran process
(Moran, 1962), and the fitness values are recalculated after each evolutionary
step. At each time step an individual is chosen for reproduction proportional
to its fitness. This newborn individual replaces another randomly selected
individual, hence the total number of the population N remains constant.
Consequently, at each time step, i can change at most by one according to the
following transition probabilities
P (i→ i− 1) = µi
P (i→ i) = 1− (µi + λi)
P (i→ i+ 1) = λi ,
(3)
where
µi =
(N − i)gi
ifi + (N − i)gi
i
N
λi =
ifi
ifi + (N − i)gi
N − i
N
.
(4)
Note that the ratio of the hopping probabilities is equal to the ratio of the
fitnesses µi/λi = gi/fi. This Markov chain is essentially a random walk on
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sites 0 ≤ i ≤ N . A walk starting at site i eventually hits one of the absorbing
states at 0 or N . We denote the probability of hitting site 0 first by ǫi and
hitting site N first by ǫ+i = 1 − ǫi. Since in one time step the walker stays
at its position or jumps to a neighboring site, these first passage probabilities
obey the N − 1 equations
ǫi = µiǫi−1 + (1− µi − λi)ǫi + λiǫi+1 (5)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N −1, and the boundary conditions ǫ0 = ǫ+N = 1 and ǫN = ǫ+0 = 0.
The solution of these equations reads as
ǫi =
si,N−1
s0,N−1
, ǫ+i =
s0,i−1
s0,N−1
. (6)
where
sn,m =
m∑
k=n
qk , qi =
i∏
j=1
µj
λj
=
i∏
j=1
gj
fj
, (7)
and q0 = 1 (Karlin & Taylor, H., 1975; van Kampen, 1997). We are particu-
larly interested in the fixation probability for a single mutant B
ǫN−1 =
qN−1
s0,N−1
, (8)
and that of a single mutant A
ǫ+1 =
1
s0,N−1
. (9)
The nature of these results are analyzed in the following sections. A single
strategist A can invade B if its fitness is greater than the resident B-s, that
is if f1 > g1 (Maxnard Smith, 1974). Since the probability of fixation is 1/N
in a neutral game, selection favors fixation of a single mutant A (that is A
to replace B) if ǫ+1 > 1/N (Taylor, C. et al., 2004). (Similar condition for the
invasion of B is fN−1 < gN−1, and for the fixation of B is ǫN−1 > 1/N .) Using
these conditions it has been shown that there are five qualitatively different
selection scenarios in finite populations for 2×2 matrix games. These different
scenarios are listed in Table 1.
The reason of writing B in front of A in the symbols of the different scenarios
in Table 1 and throughout the paper is that in this way their order is the same
as that of the pure B state (i = 0) and the pure A state (i = N) along the path
of the walk. In this way the single arrows represent the preferred direction of
the walk at each end of the chain. For example B→←A means that in case of
a single A player (i = 1) the walk prefers to step to the right (first arrow),
but with a single B player (i = N − 1) it prefers to step to the left (second
arrow). The double arrows point to the direction in which the absorption is
more possible than in the neutral game. As an example B⇒⇒A means that
4
Class Selection favors Speed
B→→⇒⇒A: A to invade and replace B fast or slow
B→←⇒⇐A: mutual invasion, A and B to coexist slow
B→←⇒⇒A: mutual invasion, A to replace B fast or slow
B←→⇒⇒A: no one to invade, A to replace B fast
B←→⇐⇒A: no one to invade or replace fast
Table 1
The possible combinations of qualitatively different fixation and invasion events.
Changing the roles of A and B does not alter the scenarios qualitatively. The speed
of the walk is discussed in Sec. 4.2, and 5.
a system with a single A player (first arrow) and also a system with a single
B player (second arrow) ends up in a pure A state more probably than in a
neutral game.
3 Average fixation time
A walk starting at site i eventually gets absorbed into either site 0 or site
N . We are interested in the mean conditional exit (or absorption) time ti
to site 0, and t+i to site N . The problem was formulated and solved for the
simple random walk in (Landauer & Bu¨ttiker, 1987; Fisher, 1988) in a more
general framework. The solution for a random walk with arbitrary hopping
probabilities is given in (van Kampen, 1997). For completeness we present
here an elementary derivation using standard methods.
Let Pi(t) be the probability that the walk gets absorbed into site 0 at time t, if
starts at site i at time 0. Obviously ǫi =
∑∞
t=0 Pi(t), and we use the convention
P0(t) = δt,0, and PN(t) ≡ 0. By definition, the conditional average exit time
is
ti =
∞∑
t=0
tPi(t)
∞∑
t=0
Pi(t)
=
1
ǫi
∞∑
t=0
tPi(t) . (10)
For Pi(t) the following recursive equation holds
Pi(t) = µiPi−1(t− 1) + (1− µi − λi)Pi(t− 1) + λiPi+1(t− 1) (11)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. As we are interested in the first moment of Pi(t), we
multiply both sides of this equation by t, and then sum it up from t = 0 to
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∞. We also apply the identity
∞∑
t=0
tPi(t− 1) =
∞∑
t=0
(t + 1)Pi(t) = ǫi(ti + 1) , (12)
[where Pi(t) = 0 for t < 0] to arrive at
ǫiti = µiǫi−1(ti−1 + 1) + (1− µi − λi)ǫi(ti + 1) + λiǫi+1(ti+1 + 1) . (13)
Using Eq. (5), and the notation τi = ǫiti, the above equation simplifies to
−ǫi = µiτi−1 − (µi + λi)τi + λiτi+1 , (14)
which, in terms of σi = τi − τi+1, becomes
σi =
µi
λi
σi−1 +
ǫi
λi
. (15)
Iterating this relation gives
σi = σ0qi + qi
i∑
k=1
ǫk
λkqk
. (16)
Since σ0 = −τ1, we know all τi for 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 as a function of τ1
τi = τ1 −
i∑
n=1
σn . (17)
The value of τ1 can be obtained from equation (14) with i = N − 1, noting
that τN = 0,
τ1 = (1− ǫ1)
N−1∑
n=1
qn
n∑
k=1
ǫk
λkqk
, (18)
hence the conditional average time (ti = τi/ǫi) to reach the origin is given by
τi = (1− ǫi)QN −Qi , (19)
where we used the shorthand notation
Qi =
i−1∑
n=1
qn
n∑
k=1
ǫk
λkqk
. (20)
The conditional average time t+i to reach the other absorbing state at site N
can be obtained similarly through τ+i = ǫ
+
i t
+
i
τ+i = (1− ǫ+i )R0 − Ri , (21)
with
Ri =
N−1∑
n=i+1
qn−1
N−1∑
k=n
ǫ+k
λkqk
. (22)
6
Formula (21) can be also obtained directly from (19) by noting that to arrive
from site i to the origin in a given chain is the same as to arrive from site
N − i to site N in a mirrored chain, where all λj are changed to µN−j and all
µj are changed to λN−j .
The expressions for the average exit times are greatly simplified for the bio-
logically relevant τN−1 and τ
+
1 . We can rewrite formula (19) as
τN−1 = (1− ǫN−1)QN −QN−1 = qN−1
N−1∑
k=1
ǫk
λkqk
− ǫN−1QN , (23)
and substituting expression (6) into ǫk we arrive at our final formula
tN−1 =
N−1∑
n=1
s0,n−1sn,N−1
λnqns0,N−1
. (24)
Following the same steps for (21) leads to an expression for t+1 which is identical
to (24), thus we call it the fixation time
tfix(N) ≡ tN−1 = t+1 , (25)
This surprising result states that the mean conditional exit times starting from
one side and being absorbed into the other side of the chain does not depend on
the particular side the walk starts, for arbitrary positive transition probabilities
(it is obviously necessary that all µi > 0 and λi > 0). We also support this
intriguing property of the walk by a simple argument in the Appendix. In the
special case of random walks with constant bias (µi = 1−λi = const), the exit
times are symmetric for all initial positions tN−i = t
+
i as shown in (Redner,
2001). Note also that for the simple random walk (µi = λi = 1/2) the formulas
(19) and (21) simplify to (Fisher, 1988; Redner, 2001)
ti =
i
3
(2N − i) , t+i =
1
3
(N2 − i2) . (26)
3.1 Fixation time in the neutral game
In the context of the game theory, the transition probabilities µi and λi depend
on the fitness of individuals using a given strategy, as it is given by Eq. (3).
A game is given by the payoff matrix (1), and the fitness of individuals using
strategy A and strategy B are determined by Eqs. (2). The simplest game is
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the neutral game given by the payoff matrix
A B
A 1 1
B 1 1
(27)
and the corresponding transition probabilities are
µi = λi =
i(N − i)
N2
. (28)
Hence the exit probabilities in a neutral game coincide with that of the simple
(fair) random walk
ǫ+1 = ǫN−1 =
1
N
. (29)
On the other hand, as µi + λi < 1, the conditional average exit times are
different. Using Eq.(24), after some straightforward algebra we arrive at
tfix(N) = tN−1 = t
+
1 = N(N − 1) , (30)
that is a neutral game fixates three times slower than a simple random walk
(26) for large N .
It seems natural to characterize the average ”speed” of fixation in a non-
neutral game by comparing the actual fixation time tfix(N) to that in a neutral
game N(N − 1). If tfix(N) > N(N − 1) then fixation is said to be slow, if
tfix(N) < N(N − 1) then fixation is fast. It is easy to check that for an N = 2
system tfix(2) = 2 independently of the elements of the payoff matrix. To write
the fixation time and probability in a closed form for a general payoff matrix
and for arbitrary N seems to be a hopeless task, but they can be derived
asymptotically in the large N limit.
4 Large N limit
In this section we derive the large N asymptotic behavior of the exact ex-
pressions for the fixation probabilities Eq.(8-9) and times Eq.(24). What large
means depends on the actual payoff matrix; the speed of convergence can be
slow for some particular choice of matrix elements (See Fig. 3 and 4). We
emphasize that the large N behavior of a finite chain is different from the
behavior in an infinite population (Neil, 2004), modeled either by a walk on
a semi-infinite chain or by a replicator equation description (Taylor, C. et al.,
2004).
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Let us derive the asymptotic behavior of the basic quantity qk first
qk =
k∏
i=1
gi
fi
= exp
(
k∑
i=1
ln
gi
fi
)
. (31)
When N is large, the above sum can be written as an integral
N
∫ y
0
dx ln
x(c− d) + d
x(a− b) + b , (32)
where y = k/N . Evaluating the integral we arrive at qk = q˜(y)
N , with
q˜(y) =
(
d
b
)y (1 + y c−d
d
)y+ d
c−d
(
1 + y a−b
b
)y+ b
a−b
. (33)
The function q˜(y) is remarkably simple: it is either convex if a− c < b− d, or
concave if a− c > b− d. At the boundaries
q˜(0) = 1 , q˜(1) =
d
(
c
d
) c
c−d
b
(
a
b
) a
a−b
. (34)
Under the interchange of players (A ⇆ B, that is a ⇆ d and b ⇆ c) the
function has the symmetry
q˜A⇆B(y) =
q˜(1− y)
q˜(1)
. (35)
Since qk = q˜(y)
N , the main contribution to the basic quantity s0,N−1 comes
from the qk terms with k/N ≈ ymax, where q˜(y) takes its maximum at ymax.
According to the value of ymax there are four scenarios, in agreement with the
replicator equation description (Taylor, C. et al., 2004)
(1) B −→ A: A dominates B, if a > c and b > d; ymax = 1
(2) B ←− A: B dominates A, if a < c and b < d; ymax = 0
(3) B ←→ A: A and B are bi-stable, if a > c and b < d; ymax = y∗
(4) B →← A: A and B coexist, if a < c and b > d; q˜(y) has minimum at y∗,
and its maximum is at ymax = 0 for 1 > q˜(1), while its maximum is at
ymax = 1 for 1 < q˜(1),
where
y∗ =
d− b
a− c + d− b . (36)
This suggests that the relevant parameters of the large N behavior are a− c
and b− d, hence we shell depict our results as a function of these variables in
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Fig. 1 and 2. Again the arrows in symbols represent the preferred direction
of the walk at each ends of the chain. B −→ A can be thought of as a short
form of B →→ A.
Using the N → ∞ limit in expression (33) we find that around the ends of
the chain
qk ≈


(
d
b
)k
, for k ≪ N ,
q˜(1)N
(
a
c
)N−k
, for N − k ≪ N .
(37)
4.1 Fixation probabilities
In order to calculate the fixation probabilities in the N → ∞ limit, we need
to know the asymptotic form of s0,N−1. Since qk = q˜
N
k , we only need the terms
around the maximum of q˜(y). In the case B −→ A (that is a > c and b > d),
the maximum is at y = 0, hence, using Eq. (37)
s0,N−1 =
N−1∑
0
qk ≈
∞∑
0
(
d
b
)k
=
b
b− d . (38)
This makes the fixation probability in the N →∞ limit
ǫ+1 =
1
s0,N−1
= 1− d
b
. (39)
Surprisingly, as this result is valid as long as the maximum of q˜(y) is at ymax =
0, this is the fixation probability in the case of B →← A (that is a < c and
b > d) when additionally q˜(1) < 1. This means that even when A and B
coexist, the fixation probability can be finite, even in the N → ∞ limit. In
this latter case however, as we shall see, the fixation time is exponentially large.
In the above two cases the fixation probability for the other player becomes
exponentially small
ǫN−1 =
qN−1
s0,N−1
∼ q˜(1)N , (40)
where we used Eq. (37). While expression (39) for ǫ+1 becomes exact as N →
∞, in the expression (40) for ǫN−1, we do not know the coefficient of q(1)N
exactly. In other words we only know that ln(ǫN−1)/N → ln q˜(1) as N →∞.
This is comprehensible as we derived the leading order behavior in both cases.
Similarly, for B ←− A (that is a < c and b < d), and also for B →← A when
q˜(1) > 1, the maximum of q˜(y) is at ymax = 1, and repeating the same steps
as before we arrive at
ǫ+1 =
(
1− a
c
)
q˜(1)1−N ∼ q˜(1)−N , ǫN−1 = 1− a
c
(41)
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In the remaining region, B ←→ A (that is a > c and b < d), the main
contribution to s0,N−1 comes from the terms around ymax = y
∗, where q˜(y)
takes its maximum q∗ = q˜(y∗) > 1. In the N → ∞ limit the sum s0,N−1 can
be replaced by an integral, which can be approximated by a Gaussian integral
(steepest descent method)
s0,N−1 ≈ Nq∗N
∫ ∞
−∞
dy exp
(
−(y − y
∗)2
2σ2
)
∼ q∗N
√
N . (42)
Thus, in this case both probabilities are exponentially small in the N → ∞
limit
ǫ+1 ∼
1√
Nq∗N
, ǫN−1 ∼ 1√
N
(
q˜(1)
q∗
)N
. (43)
To complete our investigation of the large N behavior of the absorption prob-
abilities we focus now on the axes (see Fig. 1), that is when either a = c or
b = d. When both are equal, then gi/fi ≈ qi ≈ 1, and we asymptotically
recover the behavior of the neutral game, ǫ+1 ∼ ǫN−1 ∼ 1/N . When a = c and
b > d, then the maximum of q˜(y) is at 0 with non-zero derivative, thus the
probabilities are the same as in the neighboring B −→ A region and in the
B →← A region for q˜(1) < 1. The same scenario occurs for b = d and a < c
as it can be obtained by interchanging the players.
Significantly different behavior is found on the other halves of the axes. For
a = c and b < d the maximum of q˜(y) is at 1 but with zero derivative. Hence
we should use again the steepest descent method to obtain s0,N−1 ∼ q˜(1)N
√
N
which results in ǫ+1 ∼ q(1)−N/
√
N and ǫN−1 ∼ 1/
√
N . The slowly decaying ǫ+1
on this axes interplays between the fast decaying behavior in the B ←→ A
region and the constant probability in the B −→ A region. By interchanging
the players it immediately follows that for b = d and a > c, ǫ+1 ∼ 1/
√
N and
ǫN−1 ∼ q(1)N/
√
N .
These results are summarized in Table 2 and depicted in Fig. 1.
4.2 Fixation times
To derive the large N asymptotic we use the exact expression for the fixation
time tfix given by Eq. (24). Consider first the B −→ A case. Here, the main
contribution to tfix comes from the terms around y = 0 and y = 1, where 1/λi
develops singularities. Indeed in the N →∞ limit, λi of Eq.(4) can be written
as
λi =
y(1− y)
y + (1− y)β(y) , (44)
11
✲
a− c
✻b− dB →← A
B ←− A
B −→ A
B ←→ A
ǫN−1 = 1− ac
ǫ+1 = 1− db
ǫ+1 ∼ ǫN−1 ∼ e−γN
ǫ+1 ∼ ǫN−1 ∼ 1/N
ǫN−1 ∼ 1/
√
N
ǫ+1 ∼ 1/
√
N
Fig. 1. Graphical illustration of the different scenarios for the fixation probabilities
in the large N limit as summarized in Table 2 (the value of γ > 0 can be read out
from Table 2). ǫ+1 and ǫN−1 are exponentially small where not specified. The zig-zag
line in the B →← A region refers to the boundary given by q˜(1) = 1, which is not
a line in these variables. The probabilities in this region are equal to those in one
of the neighboring regions.
where β(y = i/N) = gi/fi, and it behaves asymptotically as
λi =


d
b
1
y
for y ≪ 1
1
1− y for 1− y ≪ 1 .
(45)
Let us also investigate the asymptotic behavior of the other terms in Eq. (24).
As the main contribution to s0,N−1 comes from the first few terms, the ratio
s0,n−1/s0,N−1 → 1 as N → ∞ for any finite y = n/N . In addition to that,
close to the singularity at y = 0
sn,N−1
qn
=
N−1∑
k=n
qk
qn
= 1 +
d
b
+
(
d
b
)2
+ · · · = b
b− d . (46)
Thus, inserting the above asymptotic forms into Eq. (24), the terms around
y = 0 have a contribution
d
b− d
∑
n=1
1
y
, (47)
where we do not specify the upper limit as the relevant contribution comes
from the terms close to the lower limit
∑
n=1
1
y
∼ N
∫
1/N
dy
1
y
∼ N lnN . (48)
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✲
a− c
✻b− dB →← A
B ←− A
B −→ A
B ←→ A
tfix ∼ eγN
tfix ∼ N lnN
tfix ∼ N lnN
tfix ∼ N lnN
tfix ∼ N2tfix ∼ N3/2 tfix ∼ N3/2
tfix ∼ N3/2
tfix ∼ N3/2
Fig. 2. Graphical illustration of the different scenarios for the fixation time. The
large N behavior of the fixation time discussed in Table 2 is displayed (the value
of γ > 0 can be read out from Table 2). The thick lines refer to relevant finite size
corrections to the N →∞ behavior.
By taking into account the terms close to the other singularity at y = 1 as
well, where
sn,N−1
qn
=
N−1∑
k=n
qk
qn
= 1 +
c
a
+
(
c
a
)2
+ · · · = a
a− c , (49)
we arrive the large N asymptotic expression for the fixation time
tfix ≈
(
a
a− c +
d
b− d
)
N lnN ∼ N lnN . (50)
According to numerical evaluation of Eq. (24), the N lnN part is asymptoti-
cally exact but the amplitude is probably just a very good approximation.
Now, the B ←− A case can be easily obtained by interchanging the players
A ⇆ B in the previous case, and by noting that the fixation time is always
the same for both players as stated in Eq.(25). Hence
tfix ≈
(
a
c− a +
d
d− b
)
N lnN ∼ N lnN . (51)
Next we consider the B →← A case for q˜(1) < 1. The quantity which develops
the relevant singularity in the N →∞ limit is 1/qn. It is indeed singular at y∗
of Eq. (36), since qn = q˜(y)
N , with y = n/N , and as q(y) takes its minimum
q∗ = q(y∗) at y∗. Similarly to the previous case, s0,n−1/s0,N−1 → 1 as N →∞,
for any finite y = n/N . The term sn,N−1 gains the relevant contribution around
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y = 1 as long as q˜(n/N) < q˜(1), which is the case around the singularity as
q∗ < q˜(1). This makes sn,N−1 ≈ qN−1+qN−2+· · · ∼ q˜(1)N . As we showed in the
previous case, λn has only weak singularities at y = 0 and y = 1, leading to an
N lnN contribution to tfix, which can be safely neglected in this case. Hence
λn can be considered a constant around y
∗. Putting now all these asymptotic
expressions back to Eq. (24) we arrive at
tfix ∼
N−1∑
n=1
(
q˜(1)
q∗
)N
∼
√
N
(
q˜(1)
q∗
)N
, (52)
where, at the last step, we used the method of steepest descent again. The
case B →← A case for q˜(1) > 1 is entirely similar, with the only difference
that in the N →∞ limit sn,N−1/s0,N−1 → 1, while s0,n−1 → b/(b− d) =const
around the singularity y∗ of 1/qn. Hence, in this case
tfix ∼
√
N
(
1
q∗
)N
. (53)
In the remaining B ←→ A region we have three singularities in the expression
of Eq. (24) for tfix at y = 0, y
∗ and 1. The contribution coming from the terms
close to y = 0 and y = 1 is ∼ N lnN , analogously to the B −→ A case. We
provide a crude argument that the contribution from the singularity at y∗ is
smaller, namely ∼ N .
Let us approximate quantities in Eq. (24) around the singularity y∗ up to
second order in δ = y − y∗. Around its maximum q˜(δ) ≈ q∗(1 − βδ2), with
β > 0. This makes
qn(δ) ≈ q∗Ne−Nβδ2 , (54)
hence s0,N−1 ∼
√
Nq∗N , and in this approximation s0,n∗−1 ≈ sn∗,N−1 ≈
s0,N−1/2, where n
∗ = Ny∗. Integrating Eq.(54) for small δ ≪ 1/√Nβ, we
arrive at
s0,n−1 ∼
√
Nq∗N
(
1 + β ′
√
Nδ +O(δ3)
)
, (55)
where β ′ > 0 is a constant, and the same for sn,N−1, with −β ′ instead of β ′.
Putting these asymptotic expressions into Eq. (24) and noting that λn can be
considered as constant around y∗, we get
tfix ∼
√
N
∑
n
1 + β ′′Nδ2 ∼ N3/2
∫
dδ e−β
′′Nδ2 ∼ N , (56)
where β ′′ > 0 is another constant. Together with the contributions from y = 0
and 1 the asymptotic behavior is
tfix ∼ N lnN . (57)
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ǫ+1 ǫN−1 tfix
B −→ A (a > c, b > d) 1− d/b ∼ q˜(1)N ∼ N lnN
B ←− A (a < c, b < d) ∼ q˜(1)−N 1− a/c ∼ N lnN
B ←→ A (a > c, b < d) ∼ (1/q∗)N ∼ (q˜(1)/q∗)N ∼ N lnN
B →← A (a < c, b > d), q˜(1) < 1 1− d/b ∼ q˜(1)N ∼ (q˜(1)/q∗)N
q˜(1) > 1 ∼ q˜(1)−N 1− a/c ∼ (1/q∗)N
a = c, b = d ∼ 1/N ∼ 1/N ∼ N2
(a = c, b > d) or (b = d, a < c) ∼ q˜(1)−N ∼ 1/√N ∼ N3/2
(a = c, b < d) or (b = d, a > c) ∼ 1/√N ∼ q˜(1)N ∼ N3/2
Table 2
Fixation probabilities and times in the N → ∞ limit for different scenarios. Note,
that due to the specific values of q˜(1) and q∗, when the above quantities depend
exponentially on N , the fixation probabilities are exponentially small, while the
fixation times are exponentially large.
We complete this section as well with investigating the asymptotic behavior
on the axes. In the origin (a = c and b = d) we asymptotically recover the
results for the neutral game (Sec. 3.1). As gi/fi ≈ qi ≈ 1, sn,m ≈ m − n and
λi ≈ y(1− y) we obtain tfix ∼ N2.
For a = c and b > d the maximum of q˜(y) is at 0 with q˜′(0) < 0, hence
similarly to the B −→ A case, the terms around y = 0 have an N lnN
contribution. The relevant contribution though comes from the terms around
y = 1 where q˜′(1) = 0. Around y = 1 the ratio s0,n−1/s0,N−1 ≈ 1 and λn ≈ δ
with δ = 1− y = 1− n/N . By approximating q˜n ≈ q˜(1)(1+ βδ2) up to second
order with β > 0, we obtain
sn,N−1 ≈ Nq˜(1)Nδ(1 + βn
3
δ2) . (58)
Inserting these terms into Eq. (24) and using the steepest descent method we
arrive at the algebraically decaying asymptotic behavior tfix ∼ N3/2. The same
behavior occurs for b = d and a < c, as it follows by interchanging the players.
The b = d and a > c case goes along similar lines. The relevant contribution in
this case comes from the terms around y = 0 where q˜(y) takes its maximum
and q˜′(0) = 0. In the leading order λn ≈ y, q˜n ≈ 1 − βy2 with β > 0,
sn,N−1/s0,N−1 ≈ 1, and
s0,n−1 ≈ Ny(1− βn
3
y2) . (59)
Using Eq. (24) we arrive at the same algebraic asymptotic behavior tfix ∼ N3/2.
Interchanging the strategies leads to the same result also for a = c and b < d.
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 0  20  40  60  80  100
t fi
x/N
(N
-1)
N
a = 1 a = 1.7 a = 2
a = 2.2
a = 2.5
Fig. 3. Illustrative examples for the relative fixation time as a function of population
size when there is an ESS with coexisting strategies in the infinite population size
limit, B →← A. The payoff matrix is

 a 4
3 1

, where parameter a varies as
indicated in the figure.
These results for the asymptotic behavior of the absorption times are summa-
rized in Table 2 and also depicted in Fig. 2.
5 Numerical examples
In this section we investigate the population size N dependence of the fixation
time tfix based on numerical evaluation of the exact formula Eq. (24). For large
N values the asymptotic forms summarized in Table 2 are recovered. Relevant
deviations from these asymptotic forms are present close to the boundaries of
the two types (exponential and N lnN) of behavior, namely at the boundaries
of the B →← A region, marked with thick lines in Fig. (2).
As a typical example for large finite size effects we consider payoff matrices
of the form

a 4
3 1

 with a < 3, which then belong to the B →← A case. For
a = 1, one sees the exponentially growing fixation time in Fig. 3. As a → 3,
that is as we approach the boundary a−c = 0 in Fig. 2, the exponential growth
can be observed only for larger population sizes. As it is shown in Fig. 3 for
small population sizes, tfix can even be smaller than N(N − 1), the fixation
time for neutral games. For smaller c − a values the exponential growth of
the fixation time starts at larger N values. The same finite size behavior is
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x/N
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N
c = 3 c = 4.5
c = 4.9
Fig. 4. Illustrative examples for the relative fixation time as a function of population
size when there are only one ESS-s in the infinite population size limit, B −→ A.
The payoff matrix is

 5 2
c 1

, where parameter c varies as indicated in the figure.
observed as we approach the b − d = 0 boundary from the same B →← A
region.
Finite size effects are also relevant in the B −→ A region when approaching
the a − c = 0 boundary. In this case the asymptotically slow (∼ N lnN)
fixation time can exceed the neutral value N(N−1) for small population sizes
N . This behavior can be observed on an example in Fig. 4. Again, in general,
for smaller a − c values the fixation time exceeds that of the neutral game
up to larger values of N . The same scenario occurs in the B ←− A region as
d− b→ 0. Conversely, finite size effects are not relevant at the boundaries of
the B ←→ A region. This fact is not surprising as the large N behavior of
the fixation time is also ∼ N lnN in the neighboring domains, and even on
the boundaries it is still smaller (N3/2) than in the neutral game.
Now we make three conjectures about the fixation time for finite N values.
These conjectures are based on numerical evaluation of Eq. (24) for numerous
(∼ 50000) random (all elements are from the interval [0, 1]) payoff matrices in
for each system sizes from N = 2 to N = 100. First conjecture: tfix(N) ≤
N(N − 1) for all values of N in the B ←→ A region. The equality (tfix(N) =
N(N − 1)) was only observed in the trivial N = 2 case. Second conjecture:
if ǫN−1 > 1/N and ǫ
+
1 > 1/N then tfix(N) ≥ N(N − 1). Third conjecture:
if f1 − g1 < 0 and fN−1 − gN−1 > 0 then tfix(N) ≤ N(N − 1).
Based on the above conjectures we can predict the speed of the process in
three out of the five evolutionary scenarios established in (Taylor, C. et al.,
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2004). According to our 2. conjecture if mutual invasion and mutual fixation is
favored then fixation was experienced to be slow without exception (case 2. in
Table 1). Thus a state with coexisting strategies is likely to be observed in this
situation. This is a qualitatively new situation not present in (Taylor, C. et al.,
2004). If selection opposes mutual invasion then fixation is fast (3. conjecture),
independently whether selection favors fixation or not (cases 4. 5. in Table 1.).
This conjecture is also supported by the large N asymptotics (see Fig. 2.).
6 Discussion
We have used a recently introduced frequency dependent Moran process to
study game dynamics in finite populations. The probability that a single mu-
tant strategy A can fixate in a population consisting N − 1 individuals with
strategy B has been known (Karlin & Taylor, H., 1975; Nowak et al., 2004;
Taylor, C. et al., 2004). The stationary distribution for this system is studied
recently. It is shown numerically that this distribution can deviate significantly
from the Gaussian one (Claussen & Traulsen, 2005). We studied the average
time to fixation in this paper. We have shown that the fixation time is iden-
tical for the two strategies for a given game independently of the elements of
the payoff matrix and the population size, that is tfix(N) = tN−1 = t
+
1 . In fact
this property is necessary for fixation probabilities to meaningfully character-
ize selection scenarios. As an example consider a process where the fixation
probabilities are the same for the two strategies (ǫN−1 = ǫ
+
1 ). Then in order
to conclude that the population is observed with the same probability in both
absorbing states (Fudenberg et al., 2005) it is necessary to know that both
absorption times are the same.
Since the exact results for the fixation time and fixation probabilities are overly
complicated as a function of the payoff matrix, we also determined their large
N asymptotic behavior. We have shown that tfix ∼ N lnN if there is at least
one pure ESS in the infinite population size limit. Thus, the fixation time
becomes negligibly smaller than that of the neutral game as the population
size goes to infinity (lnN/(N − 1) → 0 if N → ∞). Interestingly, fixation is
fast even if the system is bistable (there are two ESS-s), although to arrive
from the neighborhood of one of the stable states to the other one is impossible
in the standard deterministic replicator dynamics of the infinite populations
(Hofbauer & Sigmund, 2003). On the other hand we have shown that the
fixation probability of a mutant is exponentially small in the large population
size limit. A particularly surprising result is that, as the population size grows,
the fixation probability of a dominating strategy tends to a constant less than
one. This probability depends only on the relative payoff of the non-dominant
strategy against itself to the payoff of the dominant strategy against the non
dominant one (see Table 2). Consequently, in real stochastic populations (even
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in very large ones) the probability of fixation of a dominant mutant can be very
small when the mutant strategy receives only slightly bigger payoff against the
resident strategy than the resident does against itself. One can gain an intuitive
insight into this result. When the mutant is rare, it meets with the resident
strategy much more frequently than with another rare mutants. If the mutant
has only a small advantage in this state then it can extinct easily. This is why
the fixation probability of the dominant mutant is small in this case. In the
reverse case, if the mutant plays much more effectively against the resident
strategy than the resident itself, then the rare mutant will spread with high
probability, so their fixation probability is close to one.
If strategies A and B coexist in the infinite size deterministic model then
the fixation time increases exponentially with N , that is the fixation time
tends to infinity compared to the neutral game ((eN/[
√
N(N − 1)] → ∞).
Hence in the large population limit A and B remain practically in a state
of coexisting strategies. Depending on a complex relation among the payoff
elements (q˜(1) ≶ 1) one of the strategies fixates with a constant probability
while the fixation probability of the other decreases exponentially with N
(Table 2.). While fixation is slow in this case, it is probable for a rare mutant
that plays effectively against the resident strategy (see above).
Our results about the bistable case have some consequences in the context
of the origin of cooperation. The origin of cooperative behavior among selfish
individuals remains an intriguing problem of evolutionary biology (Axelrod,
1981; Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry, 1995; Szabo´ et al., 2004; Nowak & Sigmund,
2004). Using the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game as a conceptual model
(Axelrod, 1981) Nowak et al. (Nowak et al., 2004) considered a game where a
cooperative (Tit-for-Tat) strategy plays against an always defective strategy
(AllD). In this situation both the Tit-for-Tat and AllD strategies are stable
fixed points of the classical replicator dynamics. Consequently, although a
purely cooperative population is a stable state, Tit-for-Tat can not spread in
a defective population. However, this argument is true only for infinite deter-
ministic populations. Nowak et al. demonstrated, using the model studied in
the present paper, that a single mutant cooperative Tit-for-Tat can replace
the N − 1 AllD players with high probability, for appropriate N values (not
too small, not too large). This means in our context, that the fixation proba-
bility of Tit-for-Tat could be four or five times greater than it would be in the
neutral case (1/N). On the other hand, replacement of Tit-for-Tat by AllD is
unlikely since fixation probability of AllD is smaller than 1/N for appropriate
N -s. That is, selection follow the scenario (4) in Table 1, where Tit-for-Tat
corresponds to strategy B. Nevertheless, the speed of the fixation of Tit-for-
Tat remained an open question. According to our third conjecture and our
analysis of the large N limit, however, if selection opposes mutual invasion
then the fixation is fast (cases 4 and 5 in Table 1). Consequently, if the pop-
ulation size is appropriate for the fixation of the cooperative strategy, then
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this fixation will be fast, making the spread and fixation of the cooperative
strategy more likely in finite populations.
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Appendix
In Eq.(25) we arrived at the surprising result that the fixation times are always
the same for both species. In this section we provide a simple independent
argument to support this result. Say we have a particular walk s, which starts
from site 1 at time 0, and arrives at site N for the first time at time T (s),
without having stepped on site 0. It is obvious that this walk has to step
through each bond to the right (towards site N) at least once. It is also clear
that the walk steps one more times to the right then to the left through each
bond, as eventually the walk ends up at siteN . This means that the probability
P (s) of the walk s can be written as
P (s) = λN−1
N−2∏
i=1
λ1+αii µ
αi
i+1
N−1∏
i=1
νβii = π(s)
N−1∏
i=1
λi , (60)
with αi and βi being non-negative integers, νi = 1− µi − λi, and we used the
notation
π(s) =
N−2∏
i=1
(λiµi+1)
αi
N−1∏
i=1
νβii . (61)
Now for each walk s we can uniquely construct a walk s˜, which walks backward
from site N − 1 to site 0 on the path of s, that is s˜t = N − sT (s)−1−t for
0 ≤ t < T (s), and s˜T (s) = N . The duration of the two walks are obviously
the same T (s) = T (s˜). Since s˜ steps through each bond backward compared
to s, its probability can be obtained by interchanging all λi by µi+1 and vice
versa, apart from the last steps of each walk, where we have to change λN to
µ1, that is
P (s˜) = µ1
N−2∏
i=1
λαii µ
1+αi
i+1
N−1∏
i=1
νβii = π(s)
N−1∏
i=1
µi (62)
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In order to calculate the average conditional first passage time t+1 we have to
sum over all path s, which starts from site 1 and exits at site N , that is
t+1 =
∑
{s}
T (s)P (s)
∑
{s}
P (s)
=
∑
{s}
T (s)π(s)
∑
{s}
π(s)
. (63)
Similarly, by summing over the walks which start at site N − 1 end exit at
site 0 we arrive at
tN−1 =
∑
{s˜}
T (s˜)P (s˜)
∑
{s˜}
P (s˜)
=
∑
{s˜}
T (s)π(s)
∑
{s˜}
π(s)
. (64)
Since there is a one to one correspondence between {s} and {s˜}, the two sums
are the same, that is t+1 = tN−1, what we wanted to demonstrate.
It is interesting to note that the same argument also applies to the conditional
first passage probabilities
P (t+1 = τ) =
∑
{s}
δT (s),τP (s)
∑
{s}
P (s)
=
∑
{s˜}
δT (s˜),τP (s˜)
∑
{s˜}
P (s˜)
= P (tN−1 = τ) (65)
that is not only the average first passage time, but the whole conditional first
passage probability to arrive at site N from site 1 in time τ is the same as
that to arrive at site 0 from site N − 1 in time τ .
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